
Will of God
Will of Man
Will of Flesh
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I’m not aware of any verses mentioning a “will of animal”.
The Bible uses the word(s)
: το θελημα του θεληματος τω θεληματι το θελημα τα θεληματα των θεληματων τοις θελημασιν τα θεληματα :
to describe the actions of God and Mankind, not the things the birds, animals, fish, trees and rocks and mud do.
And of course not in the same practices that Aleister Crowley invented a heroin:opium god called thelema. 🤔

I’m not sure whether I’m getting at the question you are asking, but in Aristotelian philosophy the appetitive and apprehensive powers are related but distinct. They are distinct in that knowing and willing/desiring are taken to be essentially different, but they are related in that one must first know something in order to desire it.
Some recent philosophizing about the possibility of general AI has suggested that in fact genuine intelligence requires desire, and that that is going to be a real hurdle to creating general AI–because we don’t how to make machines want things.
I tend to think that is on the right track:
When we want to explain an insight to someone, the first step is generally to *motivate* that insight: to give the person a problem that makes them care about the answer you mean to propose. (And if you can’t make the person care, you simply can’t teach the person.)
When you think about big intellectual insights, they always start with someone puzzling over something that bothers them.
One might say, curiosity and wonder are absolutely indispensable elements of intelligence, but curiosity and wonder are at root appetitive.

Sorry sorta but not really much, if what I wrote in κοινη Greek is not really the best most accurate English translation, 🤷♂️
I understand that τις, τι at the beginning of a sentence asks a question, δε is the second word of a sentence so the reader knows where the sentence would begin.
τι is the neuter gender, nominative case, to match both the neuter gender and nominative case of το ειδος, genitive:του ειδεος, and το θελημα, genitive: του θεληματος.

curiosity and will are at root appetitive
I think that Porphry, your reply is neat. What you’ve said here to explain can so be applied to the Garden of Eden story, which I’ve been focused on for a long time. This rings well with Spinoza’s theory of desire being an ingredient making up of our emotions and actions.
BDEhrman
FreedomBen
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