I am very pleased to announce that a scholar of religion who is also a log-term blog member, Dan Kohanski, has just published an intriguing book of direct relevance to what we do here on the blog (A God of Our Invention: How Religion Shaped the Western World). When I got the book I realized it would be great to have Dan do a couple of guest posts on the blog to share some of the views he develops in it. He agreed, and here is the first of three of his posts. Feel free to comment and ask questions!
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(This essay is adapted from my just-published book, A God of Our Invention: How Religion Shaped the Western World, Apocryphile Press, 2023; https://apocryphilepress.com/book/a-god-of-our-invention-how-religion-shaped-the-western-world/ . Support your local independent bookstore and order using the “Buy paperback from Bookshop” link on that webpage.)
There are several ways one can approach the Bible (including ignoring it), but I want to look here at two most of the most common ways: that of the theologian, and that of the historian. The Jewish or Christian theologian begins as someone who, for professional as well as personal reasons, takes the Bible as the literal word of God. Or who says the Bible was dictated by God to people who may or may not have heard him correctly. Or maybe it was written by people who were inspired by God but who may have let some of their own ideas get in the idea. In all events, to a theologian the word of the Bible is, more or less, the word of the Lord. A modern historian (except for a theologian trying to be a historian) will not start with any such claims.
Though it is something of an over-simplification, it may be useful to explain the different approaches taken by the theologian and the historian as using two different reasoning techniques: a priori and a posteriori. Theologians approach the Bible as true a priori—they assume it is true in advance of any examination. They will argue over the details; they will give priority to the most sacred parts—the Torah for the Jews, or the gospels for the Christians—if necessary to resolve conflicts. But they cannot permit themselves to question their fundamental assumption that the Bible somehow came from God, not if they want to maintain their status as theologians.
As an example, let us turn to the Talmud, the collection of rabbinic discussions about the law as found in the Hebrew Scripture. The rabbis invented a number of clever logical tools to help them extract every possible shade of meaning from the ancient texts and to resolve clashes between one text and another.[1] But occasionally, despite their best efforts, they were stumped. When that happened, they would throw up their hands and declare “teyku” (תיקו), meaning that the question would have to stand unresolved.[2] (See Chullin 60b for one of these instances.) In other words, they knew there was an answer that preserved the sanctity of the texts even if they just couldn’t see it for themselves.
Historians do the opposite. They do not have to take teyku for an answer, as it were. They approach the Bible a posteriori—they do not assume in advance that it is true. They will look to apply the classic rule for historians, as for the humanities and sciences in general, Occam’s Razor—the simplest explanation that covers all the known evidence, the explanation that makes the most sense, is the one most likely to be correct. Another rule, more specific to the history of religion, is Hume’s Maxim: extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. If one makes a claim of a supernatural event and there is a natural explanation, we must accept the natural one instead.
Consider the claim that Joshua made the sun and the moon stand still (Josh. 10:12-13). Although the sun and moon appear to move across the sky, really it’s the earth that does most of the moving. The earth spins on its axis at about a thousand miles an hour at the equator. If Joshua had indeed stopped the earth in its tracks, there would have been earthquakes and tsunamis of unimaginable proportions, and the whole planet would have been destroyed. The claim requires extraordinary evidence for us to accept it, and there is none. (The book of Joshua is not evidence; it’s the claim.) However, there is a natural explanation that makes sense. We have evidence that the book of Joshua was largely composed in the period when the kingdom of Judah was a vassal state in the Assyrian empire. Biblical scholar Thomas Römer explains that the sun and moon were major Assyrian deities, such that the story of Joshua’s stopping them in the sky was a way of saying that Yahweh was in control of the Assyrian gods.[3] The author of Joshua was therefore not claiming that Joshua literally stopped the sun and moon; he was reassuring the Israelites that their god was more powerful than the Assyrian gods, powerful enough to make them stand still.
A historian who is not wedded to the belief in the Bible as true will be willing to accept this argument (assuming it stands up to the usual scholarly scrutiny). A theologian will have more difficulty doing so—although not necessarily: the medieval Jewish theologian Maimonides acknowledged that “those passages in the Bible, which in their literal sense contain statements that can be refuted by proof, must and can be interpreted otherwise.”[4]
Maimonides remains controversial in Jewish circles even today, nor is his dictum likely to get a hearing from many of the current crop of Christian theologians. We can perhaps get an understanding of why this gap, this chasm, stands between the theologian and the historian by returning to the generalizations offered earlier in this essay: the theologian approaches the Bible a priori while the historian does so a posteriori. A priori uses deductive logic: start with some premises whose truth is assumed, and deduce from them the best (or only) possible conclusion. Premise: all cats are grey; premise: Dewey is a cat; conclusion: Dewey is grey. He’s not; he’s light brown (and also a pest), but by saying that, I have questioned the first premise, and that is anathema in a theological context. A posteriori reasoning is inductive: let’s examine the universe of cats and count how many of them are which colors, and determine (induce) whatever conclusions we can from that. (I still deduce that Dewey is a pest who thinks my desk is his sleeping space.)
Deductive reasoning produces definitive conclusions that must follow from the premises, while inductive reasoning leads to likely conclusions that are always open to doubt. Historians are able to live with doubt (or should be able to); theologians, not so much. “But ask in faith, never doubting, for one who doubts is like a wave of the sea, driven and tossed by the wind,” says the Letter of James in the New Testament. It goes on to warn that the “doubter . . . must not expect to receive anything from the Lord” (James 1:6, 8).
If there were a verse in the Bible that read “Truly I say unto you, all cats are grey,” and I doubted whether that was true (there is a non-grey cat on my desk, after all), a theologian might argue that Dewey isn’t really a cat. Or that someday he will be grey. Or that God made me see his color differently in order to test my faith.[5] Those are the sorts of arguments a theologian might offer. A historian, however, might suggest that whoever wrote that verse probably lived in a town where all the cats were the offspring of a pair of grey cats, and thus knew only grey cats. That is a simple explanation, and one that makes sense, but it’s a natural explanation that takes God out of the picture and leaves the Bible as a fallible document created by human beings. Yet it is exactly the sort of argument that a historian might offer.
So long as theologians look to the Bible for inspiration and hope, they can read it as they like. Once they claim the Bible is actual history, however, then it becomes subject to the way historians read it, with all the doubts and tests that are the historian’s stock in trade. You can approach the Bible as a theologian or as a historian, but trying to be both at the same time is like trying to stop the earth from spinning.
[1] Talmud study is excellent preparation for law school!
[2] An alternate reading is תיק״ו: “When Elijah comes to announce the messiah, he will answer all questions and difficulties.”
[3] Römer, Thomas C. The So-Called Deuteronomic History: A Sociological, Historical, and Literary Introduction. London: T & T Clark International, 2005; 83–90.
[4] Maimonides, Guide for the Perplexed 2:25.
[5] This last one is a riff on the claim by some fundamentalists that God made dinosaur fossils appear to be millions of years old as a test of our faith.
What is your view of the impostor hypothesis as an explanation for the resurrection appearances (as presented e.g. in the “Nature”-praised work “The Gospel of Afranius”)? It seems to have greater explanatory power for mass appearances, mentioned e.g. in Paul’s list, as well as for embarrassing (and therefore potentially true) details like the non-recognition of Jesus by the disciples at the Lake of Gennesaret appearance?
I’m not familiar with the “imposter hypothesis” (despite Bart’s kind words of introduction, I consider myself a student, not a scholar), though I can guess what it means, and I am not inclined to accept the idea that someone impersonated a risen Jesus in order to convince his followers of his resurrection. A much simpler (pace Occam’s Razor) explanation is “bereavement visions” (something I’ve experienced myself), in which one has a vision of a recently deceased loved one. For more on this, see Bart’s book, How Jesus Became God, 183-204.
Regarding Paul’s “500,” though, from what I’ve read no one else mentions them, and there is no explanation of what Paul’s talking about. Maybe he made it up.
What is your view of other mass appearances on Paul’s list (to the group of disciples at once), and of the empty tomb? Obviously, you are right that the impostor hypothesis is exotic, but an exotic hypothesis might better explain exotic things 🙂 [Please see the mentioned “Nature”-praised work and the most recent discussion in “Historical Jesus” section of the Forum if this is of any interest.]
OK< I looked at your thread in the forum. Again, applying Occam's Razor, I would say that someone deliberately impersonating Jesus for whatever specific reason is less credible than his original followers having bereavement visions. Once the first one "saw" him, others would say they "saw" him as well; they may have felt it necessary to imitate each other in order to maintain status in the group, or the first report may have triggered their own bereavement vision. Paul's "vision" could have "occurred" because he was not part of the original group, and he needed to establish his bona fides; this was one way to do it.
…There is only one thing that I know for sure: Yeskov’s work really *gets* apologists, big time 🙂 This might come in handy, so thank you and I’ll leave you with that 🙂
I agree with your bereavement vision hypothesis
Excellent essay, Dan. Thanks.
If I may please: if by some sort of miracle, all living homo sapiens were to agree that there is a “right” method betwixt the “a priori” and the “a posteriori,” how should we adjudicate between the two?
After all, both the theologian and the historian make assumptions that should be rooted against some brute fact that perhaps neither proponent may be able to demonstrate meaningfully to be the case to each other.
Much as I dislike binary choices (something we inherited from Aristotle), I do think in this case that it would be difficult to find a middle ground between a priori and a posteriori reasoning. The best I can come up with on the spur of the moment is that all reasoning does have to begin with some propositions determined a priori, such as use of the scientific method. (At least that method has been proven to be useful.)
And while there are some theologians who are willing to listen to historians, I fear that the gap is widening, in that those theologians who are unwilling to be challenged by history are shouting down those who are.
The epistemological question (“How do we know what is true?”) is contentious and ultimately frustrating to those that want to solve problems. What is of practical interest is “What is possible?” In evaluating any body of knowledge, then, we should be asking the second. In reading the Bible, for example, I feel compelled by the answer “That living creatures should learn to love.” Whether as mythological or historical record, the Bible is a compelling exploration of that goal.
Does the shift in perspective seem useful?
Your answer (“That living creatures should learn to love”) is useful as an exhortation, but it’s not the sort of answer that history is looking for, as I see it. Historians want to know what happened and why it happened. And while some historians may look at past history to find suggestions as to how we should behave in the future, when they do that, they are acting more as advocates than as disinterested historians. That’s not necessarily wrong – heck, I do that in my book from time to time – but it’s important to do it only after having made as objective an examination of the history as possible. In other words, we shouldn’t be slanting history in order to justify a predetermined conclusion (which is what many theologians do).disabledupes{6c752b75f514a7f6339f925593796aa6}disabledupes
thank you for doing this. Ordered paperback. look forward to next two.
Thank you for sharing the Joshua insight about the sun standing still. I wondered how to explain that one… other than it being fiction or divine interference. Context is often much harder to find… especially for people not spending their lives studying the texts in question. So thank you, I had to wait until my fifties to discover the world outside the “Matrix” I lived in for the first half century of my life. There are a whole lot of things that make sense now… Amazing how context can lead to understanding.
Dear Dan – before I even start reading your post, I want to thank you, Thank You, THANK YOU for supporting independent bookstores! I will be purchasing your book from the awesome indie in my community.
Great post, Dan! Just bought your book and look forward to reading it. I won’t be reading it “a priori” though, so it better make sense 🙂
Hah!
I might purchase the ebook at a later date!
As a Christian, I approached almost every thing in my life with an a priori approach except my faith and the Bible. When I decided to apply the a priori approach to the Bible is when I lost my faith (I realize this is not a universal outcome). But I felt it was more genuine for me and it got rid of the cognitive dissonance. Thanks for the essay. I look forward to the others.
Excellent thoughts. As a medical doctor I have encountered many smart people very familiar with the scientific approach to knowledge, and yet when it came to religious claims they totally ignored that approach. I know – I was there, too! So, there is not just a priori and a posteriori reasoning, but we have the ability to segregate our thinking in such a way that we apply different forms of reasoning to different areas of life. Fascinating, but also frustrating when trying to discuss religion! (Or politics and other areas of life, too.)
Since you seem to show an interest in fighting Big Biblio, I thought you might know. I see that bookshop.org, which I hadn’t heard of before (thank you!) is a good source for new books, but apparently doesn’t carry used books. Do you know of any online portals for *used* books drawing from the inventories of independent booksellers *besides* Abe Books (owned by Amazon) and Alibris (owned directly by Jeff Bezos)?
‘Fraid not.
Try Thriftbooks.com. They’re owned by a couple of LLCs that I don’t know anything about, but they ain’t Amazon.
Since you seem to show an interest in fighting Big Biblio, I thought you might know. I see that bookshop.org, which I hadn’t heard of before (thank you!) is a good source for new books, but apparently doesn’t carry used books. Do you know of any online portals for *used* books drawing from the inventories of independent booksellers *besides* Abe Books (owned by Amazon) and Alibris (owned directly by Jeff Bezos)?
First, let me apologize in advance for any confusion this post may cause. My worldview and questions are off putting to most people.
For example, I just working on a thought experiment related to this quote of yours.
“If one makes a claim of a supernatural event and there is a natural explanation, we must accept the natural one instead.”
But what if the supernatural explanation actually conforms more to Occam’s Razor? For example, evolution. If all species evolved from primordial ooze beginning 4.5 billions years ago, why don’t have dinosaurs today? After the extinction event, why didn’t the evolutionary process recreate dinosaurs? Maybe the creator the universe created the universe through the evolutionary process, but 65 million years ago got tired of dinosaurs and in a Monty Python moment said to himself “now for something completely different.”
I know you think I’m a crackpot.
My real question for you is here. How does your book compare to Richard Wright’s Evolution of God?
Second real question. Do you intend to have an audiobook version? I would have already bought it if it were on Audible.
Finally, thank you for providing content to “out there” thinkers like me.
The publisher has no plans for an audio book.
I misspoke the author’s name, Robert Wright rather than Richard Wright, regarding The Evolution of God, but what are your thoughts about that book in relation to yours.
We take similar approaches to the question of the development (alright, evolution) of Jewish and Christian ideas of God, and in some of my drafts, I cited to his book. He covers more than I do (shamanism and Islam) and less than I do (how the ways in which the Christian idea of God developed impacted our world).
I got your book and I’m reading it now.
Can I be a theologian who views the Bible with a historical lens? I’m almost done with my M.Div. degree and have always considered myself a theologian-in-training, but I do not view the Bible as inerrant or even as the word of God. Can I live in the grey area?
I deliberately wrote into this piece that there can be a grey area. However, I rarely find anyone in it. Good luck finding a space there!
Hi Dan. Thanks for that post. I have read several of your pieces / essays on academia.edu – most interesting and informative. Your new book is available at an Australian online bookstore (Booktopia) and I’ll be ordering a copy in the next little while.
In your experience, have you ever heard or read any devoted Christian theologians publicly declare that they are determined to see the Bible as inerrant / the word of god etc. ? Having watched several of these types on YT (NT Wright, Mike Licona, Mike Winger and many others) the impression I get is that they really believe that any conclusions they reach are simply from reading the Bible “as is”, and not because they have a pre existing agenda.
Thank you.
By definition, fundamentalists see the Bible (usually the KJV translation) as inerrant. Some have put a twist on it: the “original” text was inerrant, but unfortunately it’s been lost, which allows them to excuse any problems with the current versions.
I see. Thank you.
Dan,
I loved your article. Just wonderful.
I bought the book and look forward to the next posts.
Two thoughts: whilst it is true that we cannot take the Bible as the word of God, particularly if we don’t believe God exists, the Bible is still used as an essential aid in the historical research. Archaeology, for example, excavates places the Bible mentions. Whether the Biblical tales are found to be historically correct, once the subject is duly investigated, is something else.
Very interesting interpretation of Joshua’s story. I had never heard it before. Nevertheless, it seems equally provable that the event was an eclipse. It’s the explanation I grew up with.
Please see the article below and tell me what you think.
https://www.timesofisrael.com/3224-years-later-scientists-see-first-ever-recorded-eclipse-in-joshuas-battle/
https://www.timesofisrael.com/3224-years-later-scientists-see-first-ever-recorded-eclipse-in-joshuas-battle/amp/
The problem with that explanation is that it doesn’t account for the next verse: “And the sun stood still in the middle of the heavens and did not hasten to set for a whole day” (Josh. 10:13). As Robert Alter explains in his translation, the point of halting the sun was to give Joshua more daylight in order to see and destroy his enemies. In any case, the book of Joshua was written long after the time of the events it supposedly describes, so it’s highly unlikely the author(s) would have known about that eclipse or felt a need to explain/use it. Finally, the year of the eclipse, 1207 BCE, is the year (give or take) of the Merenptah stele, where the pharaoh announces that he destroyed Israel’s agriculture (the Egyptian word prt, often translated as “seed,” really means seed as in “grain”). The stele, being a contemporaneous artifact, is presumptively more reliable than Joshua.
Interesting article. However, I am advocating and applying both principles (posteriori & priori) in the same time, and I am probably able to add here something about this.
I am a Muslim and I totally believe in my Islamic metaphysics. However, when analyzing a metaphysical subject then I do the following parallel analyses: The scientific historical analysis (SHA) and the metaphysical analysis (MA).
In SHA I only include data that don’t contradict with the scientific laws of nature. Therefore, metaphysical data aren’t included in this analysis. So, The prophethood of Moses, Jesus and Muhammed are metaphysical data and they aren’t included in SHA.
In MA, I will include the legitimate metaphysical texts, and these texts would have priority (depending on the clarify of interpretation) over the scientific data.
Now … There will be clear gaps between the SHA and MA, and this is where the fun begins as I am able to analyze the gap between the conclusions of these two analyses. In many cases, the gap analysis could draw my attention to different possible meanings in the metaphysical text or it could draw my attention to possible conclusions in SHA.
—>
—–>
This would allow me to legitimately reduce the gap between Science and Metaphysics: the gap will probably never close, but it could be reduced to its minimum.
[This would make SHA a bit different than posteriori as I am interested in both: the “simplest logical solution” and the “best logical solution”].
So, I have contradictive conclusions between SHA and MA, and I have no problem in that. The reason is that the conclusions in SHA does not affect my believe system as I am aware that the purpose of SHA is to create contradictive conclusions because there is a strict filter that govern the data entry to this domain.
Although MA is dominant over SHA in regard to my belief system, but still, SHA is a very important domain in my research and analysis. For example, my interactions and discussions here in the blog are governed mainly by SHA, and it is very seldom that I discuss matters from my metaphysical perspective.
So, it is possible for the theologian and historian domains to interact positively in the mind in the same time without fighting or affecting each other.
The human mind has endlessly capacity for compartmentalization. As the Red Queen said, “I make it a practice to believe six impossible things before breakfast.” So, as you say, it is possible for the theologian and historian to interact, but I suggest they cannot do so at the same time; they must, as it were, take turns. Thus, it would be possible for me as a Jew to conclude, on the basis of the evidence, that the exodus never happened and Moses never received the law on Mount Sinai, and at the same time still follow the law. Unfortunately for that approach, I have also concluded, on the evidence, that those laws are largely copied or adapted from the laws and customs of neighboring nations. (That doesn’t mean I will break the law against murder, but I might feel no obligation to obey the law of shatness (mixing linen and wool).)
Thanks Dan; a lot for me to think about there.
But perhaps you might consider qualifying your approval of Hume’s maxim?
“.. extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. If one makes a claim of a supernatural event and there is a natural explanation, we must accept the natural one instead.”
One practical instance where Hume applied this maxim, and maintained it against the criticisms of ‘theologians’, was his lifelong defence of the institution of slavery (and of his enjoyment of profits from that institution). The claims of theologians ,that all humans were equal in dignity were rejected by Hume as being contrary to nature – since by nature humanity consists of four or five different species; of which some were ‘naturally’ determined to serve; whilst one in particular (which happened to be the one Hume claimed membersip of), was ‘naturally’ determined to command.
“I am apt to suspect the negroes and in general all other species of men (for there are four or five different kinds) to be naturally inferior to the whites.”
Which shows ‘Hume’s Maxim’ to be nothing other than question-begging ; privileging arguments congenial to oneself, while demanding stricter proof from others.
I think it more likely shows that Hume was not above misapplying his own maxim. That doesn’t make the maxim invalid.
Many thanks for the quick response Dan.
In my view, Hume’s applicaiton of his maxim should prompt serious concerns as to its validity.
I see nothing wrong with privileging a limited set of propositions which represent discourses of ‘established assertions” which it is commonly mischievous and abusive to treat as open to debate. Examples I would propose would be:
– that human dignity is one and inviolable,
– that slavery is evil,
– that torture may not be justified under any circumstances.
In terms of Hume’s maxim though, these are all ‘extraordinary claims’ – as indeed are most propositions we might consider ‘established natural science’, e.g. – that global heating is a real consequence of human activity.
For Hume’s maxim, ‘natural understanding’ is limited solely to propositions addressing the questions; what?, when?, who? and where?. All propositions addressing the questions; why? or how? – hence all assertions of causes and effects and all judgements of quality – are necessarily ‘extraordinary’. They are incapable of ‘natural proof’, so they can be disregarded.
In my view, the historian, no less than the theologian, should not plead the principles of ‘nature’ to avoid having to address the questions how? and why?.
Thanks, Dankoh and Tom, your dialog here was very enlightening.
I think Hume’s maxim lacks a vital component: who is going to make the decision that the claim is extraordinary? Me, You, my culture, or your culture?
For example:
Claim-1: God exist.
Claim-2: God doesn’t exist.
Which claim is the extraordinary one?
Atheists say that it is the first one. I can argue the opposite: all civilizations in history believed that God (or Gods) exit, and it is an emergent belief that God doesn’t exist. This emergent belief should be regarded as the alternative hypothesis. Therefore, it is the extraordinary one.
So, we have different decisions here based on our different cultural backgrounds.
I agree with Tom, it seems that Hume’s maxim has been designed as a tool to main the status quo. I think the obvious old statement is much better: claims need evidences.
Omar;
thanks for your comments; if you are interested in following through the arguments for, and against, Hume’s maxim, you might enjoy looking at John Earman’s book, ‘Hume’s Abject Failure’, widely accessible on-line.
(Spoiler alert: Earman doesn’t think much of either Hume or his maxim)
As Earman points out, the principle that the rational observer should balance the likelihood of a proposition being the case against the likelihood of testimony for that proposition being misleading, was well understood at the time, and is still useful. As, for example; if I take a diagnostic test for COVID that has a specificity of one false positive result in twenty, and the population prevalence of COVID is one in two-hundred, then a positive test result is more likely to be false than true.
But there is nothing ‘extraordinary’ here; the same principle is applied to any claim. The problem comes – with Hume’s maxim – when some claims are arbitrarily privileged as ‘natural’ and some are relegated as ‘supernatural’. Hume avoids defining these terms; but as Earman points out, given his skepticism about causality overall, he cannot do so in any way that makes his ‘maxim’ logically coherent.
But my apologies Omar; I should first have addressed your particular question, Which claim: ‘that God exists’, ‘that God does not exist’; is ‘extraordinary’ – or are both; or neither?
Perhaps it might help to consider that Dan presents his hypothetical debate between a historian and a theologian as probabilistic; which explanation of the evidence presented is the more likely? And it is fair enough that, in Hume’s day, religious apologists were inclined to express belief in God in probabilistic terms; as the more rational explanation. As for instance the classic argument of ‘Paley’s watch’ – that the undoubted observation of a watch (the universe) implies a probable unobserved ‘watchmaker’ (God).
But most modern philophical theologians would consider Paley’s argument as specious. They would rather agree with Anselm of Canterbury, that the existence of God cannot be a contingent claim – that might be true or not; rather, either the universe is such that there must be a God, or it is such that there cannot be a God. We may be uncertain which claim is true; but either way. there can only be one answer.
If so, both your claims are unique and extraordinary.
Tom –
You’re quite correct that I present my argument in probabilistic terms; in fact, that word could be used to explain the difference between a priori and a posteriori; the former deals in binary true-or-false, while the latter deals in probabilities. That is perhaps a bit simplistic, but it serves the purpose.
As for the existence of some sort of divine Being (call it God), that is not a falsifiable assertion, and as such not subject to proof or disproof; one believes, or one does not. It is not subject to probabilities. However, it is possible to show to a high probability (very high) whether the particular God as described in either the Hebrew Scripture or the New Testament exists. (Spoiler alert: I contend that this God does not exist as God, but only as a strictly human creation.)
Thank you, Tom.
There is an issue here with your example: If Peter made a Covid test and it came positive, and the test error ratio is 1 false per 20 positives, then the question: “what is the probability that Peter is infected with Covid” has clear specific frame that includes only two variables: Peter result and the error ratio, regardless of how many infected people in the community and regardless of the location of the test.
However, I did look yesterday at John Earman book and found it very complex. So, I search in google to see if the theory in the book has practical applications, and it seems not, or at least I felt that the book is not a reference in Statistics.
But this conclusion might be unfair, because it seems to me that John didn’t write a statistical book, but he wrote a mathematical book for one purpose only: to refute Hume’s mathematical model about miracles.
Dan
Your distinction betwen scriptural understandings ‘a priori’ and ‘a postieriori’ is very useful; nevertheless I do not think that you should exclusively associate theological method with the former, and historical method with the latter.
To illustrate the point; suppose that I rewrite your second paragraph (above), replacing the term ‘God’ with ‘The Universe’. I think you will agree that it still makes perfect sense; we cannot prove or disprove the existence of our Universe; but we can state with a high degree of probability that the particular physical description of universe in the first chapter of Genesis does not correspond with the one that we currently observe.
But the historian is not excused from claiming that the Universe exists; since the probabilistic events of history are not events if there was no universe within which they occurr. The historian may take that ‘a priori’ claim from formal scriptures or not; but to my mind whatever the source of their claim functions as scripture for them.
Similarly, Christian theologians claim ‘a priori’ that the Universe exists as the ‘ordinary revelation of God’s Word’. But to study God’s Word revealed in Creation, the Christian theologian must reason ‘a posteriori’.
Well, I went to some pains to show that my categories were meant to be descriptive and not mutually exclusive, also that there is some overlap between theologians and historians (though perhaps less so than there used to be). But we can prove the universe (defined as everything that is around us) by evidence, unless you want to adopt the Berkeleyan idealism.
Still, there is a pattern among the more conservative and especially fundamentalist Christians to reject any a posteriori argument when it conflicts with their a priori position, while a historian is less likely to do so (and if they do, other historians will jump on them for it).
“But we can prove the universe (defined as everything that is around us) by evidence, unless you want to adopt the Berkeleyan idealism”
Intriguing claim Dan; I would be interested in how you might construct an experiment ‘a posteriori’ to determine the probability of there being a universe?
Otherwise, your loose definition of the universe appears to me clearly ‘a priori’, and so not capable of proof. You seem to be pointing to things that exist to demonstrate the consequent logical necessity of their being ‘claims of existence’, such that the totality of such claims would constitute the universe. If such were to be considered evidential ‘proof’ of the universe, then a religious believer could advance the same hand-waving as evidence for God.
A more systematic defintition of the universe might be that of Wittgensein – as the “totality of facts in logical space” (Tractatus 1.13); but I am still stumped as to how that totality of facts can be proved probabilistically; as indeed how they can be proved ‘a priori’ in a way that excludes the possibility of a counterpart proof of the existence of God.
I used “proof” in the scientific sense, meaning that, well, call it the “theory of the universe,” explains everything we experience, has no conflicts or contradictions, and consistently obeys the laws of physics that we developed by observing it. And this proof is capable of being corrected or even discarded on the basis of new evidence (eg, that Berkeley was right, and you are all figments of my – seriously warped – imagination). Nor is it necessary to “prove” that the universe was intelligently created in order to prove that it exists.
Religion has a different concept of proof: conformity to the revealed text. (OK, not all religions, but we’re mainly talking Abrahamic ones.) It will only accept correction if it comes from a better reading of the text. Example: not all fundamentalist Christians say the earth was literally created in 6 days; some accept that a “day” could have been millions of years. But they still insist on the order of creation, even though science has shown it couldn’t have happened that way.disabledupes{c8edf9c4668446c928a55281d9adfbf2}disabledupes
Many thanks Dan; more rigorous, and I think clearer.
The Universe , for the historian, must be a discourse; “the universe is the totality of facts, not of things” (Wittgenstein: Tractatus 1.1). Any such proposed discourse should be capable of logical proof.
And, supposing several competing coherent ‘theories of the universe’, we can further test these empirically – e.g. whether an ‘expanding’ or ‘steady’ universe better explains our observational data.
But If you are seeking empirically to validate (or falsify) your ‘candidate’ universes against an assumed observed universe, you cannot claim the same comparison as also validating or falsifying the universe of empirical observation. That would be circular.
Unless you are able to specify what observational findings would convince you that the theory of an empirical universe is false?
I could propose three ways out of this:
1. hand-waving; “the Universe obviously exists, and no useful purpose is served by doubting this”.
2. A priori reasoning: “historical method, as much theological method, proceeds from ‘a priori’ specification of the Universe.”
3. ‘Ontological arcument’; “for there to be any theory of ‘being’, the ultimate ground of ‘being’ (Universe or God) must exist both as necessity and fact.”
I vote for #1, with this emendation: “the Universe obviously exists, as no useful purpose is served by doubting this”
Thanks Dan;
You may be in good company in preferring #1 as reformulated; Dr Johnson for instance.
As I think may be clear, My vote is for #2; but then I am by inclination, a historian – and so determined to establish the facts of how ‘things’ can change within a continuing Universe; while that Universe is nevertheless one for which we can postulate an empirically determined beginning (and maybe end). But if you are not a historian – or a fundamental chemist or physicist – the empirical bounds of the Universe may well be of limited interest and use.
I think I am correct in reading Richard Dawkins as preferring #3 (though he does not trumpet the fact) – and this preference is not uncommon amongst ‘New Atheists’. The attraction being that, notwithstanding acceptance of the Universe as the ultimate ground of being, the specific claims of religious believers on the nature of God can then be critiqued on empirical grounds. Even if the Ontological Argument establishes the existence of an entity that could be labelled ‘God’, that god is so jejune as to be theologically useless.
Tom, this interesting.
You have concluded from your analysis that both claims are extraordinary. However, someone might say that the first claim is the extraordinary one. Another might say the opposite. And a fourth one might conclude that both claims aren’t extraordinary because it is either one or the other.
Therefore, Hume’s Maxim lacks an objective decision process that can differentiate between extraordinary and non-extraordinary claims.
Therefore, I agree with you in regard to your criticism towards Hume’s Maxim.
Dan, your article was very interesting and so relevant to me just now. I’ve just finished reading The Bible Unearthed by Israel Finkelstein and Neil Silberman. It was absolutely fascinating to learn how the archeological finds stack up against the Biblical stories, AND to understand how the archeologist’s preconceived notions that the Bible accounts were infallibly true, led them to make incorrect conclusions so many times.
I’m looking forward to getting a copy of your book and learning more!
Sorry for the late comment (I am catching up). I am glad you mention the “pattern among the more conservative and especially fundamentalist Christians” at one point – I think mainstream or progressive theologians would lose all credibility with their intended audience if they did NOT accept that there are historical errors in the Biblical text. Still, I am sure it is difficult to decide where to draw the line – where does faith (belief) in certain propositional claims become necessary? What basic facts must one believe in order to claim to be Christian? (That question will get a broad range of answers, I think!)
There are so many branches within branches just within Protestant Christianity that it’s practically impossible to keep track of them all. (And from I’m hearing, there will soon be more branches, as the United Methodists start to disunite.) My temptation is to play theologian here rather than historian, and say that the basic belief (not fact) one must hold to be a Christian is that Jesus (Christ) came to save us from sin.
Now, I’ve deliberately worded that to be ambiguous. Did he do so by dying on the cross? Did he do by teaching a new morality? Did he did so by warning everyone that time is running out? Some of the above? All of the above? And finally, is belief in Jesus the only way to salvation?
I suggest that while there are many who call themselves Christians would answer Yes to all of those questions, but there are some nowadays who call themselves Christians who would not answer Yes to all of them, especially to the last one.